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Belsky: Bush v. Gore--A Critique of Critiques

BUSH V. GORE-A CRITIQUE OF CRITIQUES
Martin H. Belsky*
On December 12, 2000, The United States Supreme Court
determined the winner of the Presidential election of 2000.1 Since that
time, there have been at least nine books,2 numerous short legal
commentaries, 3 many longer law review articles, 4 and countless e-mail
discussions s analyzing this decision and its propriety.6 This article will

* Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; J.D. Columbia
University 1968.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William
Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001); Alan M. Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice:How the
High CourtHyacked Election 2000 (Oxford U. Press 2001); Howard Gillman, The Votes that
Countec How the Court Decided the 2000 PresidentialElection (U. Chi. Press 2001);
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamala S. Karlen & Richard H. Pildes, When Elections Go Bad: The
Law of Democracy and the PresidentialElection of 2000 (rev. ed., Found. Press 2001);
Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock. 7he 2000 Election, the Constitution and the
Courts (Princeton U. Press 2001); Roger Simon, Divided We Stand. How Al Gore Beat
George Bush and Lost the Presidency (Crown Publishers 2001); Deadlock The Inside Story
of America's Closest Election (Wash. Post ed., PublicAffairs 2001); The Vote: Bush, Gore,
and the Supreme Court (Cass Sunstein & Richard Epstein eds., U. Chi. Pres 2001); 36
Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 PresidentialElection (John Wright et al. eds.,
Times Books 2001).
3. See e.g. E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol, supra n. 2, at 165-341. There are, in
addition, many short pieces or commentaries in law school alumni magazines, legal
newspapers, and even in the Chronicle of Higher Education. See e.g. James Blumstein &
Suzanna Sherry, The 2000 PresidentialElection: What Happens When Law and Politics
Collide? Vanderbilt Law. 18-27 (Spring 2001); Dan Lowenstein, Election 2000, UCLA Law
32-33 (Fall-Winter 2000-2001); Michael Doff, Was the Bush v. Gore Decision Political?,
Colum. L. Sch. Report 22-25 (Spring 2001); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, High Court's Misuse of
the Past, 23 Natl. L.J. A20 (Jan. 15, 2001); Jonathan Ringel, Does Ideology Count? Politics
Sure Does, Leg. Times 7 (July 2, 2001); What We'll Remember in 2050: 9 Views on Bush v.
Gore, Chron. Higher Educ. B15-16 (Jan. 5, 2001).
4. See e.g. Symposium, Bush v. Gore: Democracy and Disorder,68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679
(2001); Student Author, Non Sub Homine? A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of
Election 2000, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2170 (2001); Kim Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count.
The 2000 Election and the Failureof the Rule of Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (2001).
5. I belong to a listserv for constitutional law professors moderated by Professor Eugene
Volokh. From election day 2000 to May of 2001, and even after, the number of comments,
criticisms, defenses, and justifications seemed endless. At one point, in the Spring, I
counted more than 250 Bush v. Gore entries. This is in addition to the numerous
comments on the law prof listserv, open and available to all law professors.
6. I must confess, not wishing to lose the opportunity for educating the public and to
bring visibility to The University of Tulsa College of Law, the law school and the College's
Federalist Society joined in the analysis game and sponsored an evening symposium on
January 11, 2001, entitled "Bush v. Gore: the Case of the Century." Speakers represented
the Democratic and Republican official positions, and supposedly more neutral positions
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review some of these criticisms.7
My goal is to organize the factual and legal history and the issues
implicated by the Presidential election of 2000, followed by my own
perspective. I do not claim that my opinions are any better. Nor do I
claim that they will be more thoughtful, more objective, or even more
articulate. I do hope that by putting some structure to the on-going
debate, I can contribute to the effort to put the case into historical
jurisprudential perspective.
I.

A.

THE STORY

Election Night

The entire factual and legal story concerning the contested
Presidential election of 2000 has been extensively documented
elsewhere, sometimes objectively and sometimes not.s My goal here is to
organize it in as straightforward a fashion as possible.
On Tuesday, November 7, 2000, the voting citizens of the United
States9 cast their ballots for the next President of the United States,
indirectly, of course, by voting for electors in each state who in turn
would vote for the next President.'° Most voted for either Vice President
Albert Gore, Jr., the nominee of the Democratic party, or Governor
George W. Bush, the nominee of the Republican party."'
The election was a close one, not only based on the popular vote,
but also on the electoral vote. In fact, it soon became evident that the
electoral vote, which of course determined who would be the next
President,12 was so close that the winner of Florida's electors would be

from academics and jurists. See David Harper, Bush vs. Gore Put Into Perspectives, Tulsa
World 12 (Jan. 12, 2001).
7. Compare Posner, supra n. 2, at 3, 198-220 (criticism of the "professorial
commentators").
8. ComparePosner, supra n. 2, at 12-149; Dershowitz, supran. 2, at 15-93 with Wright
supra n. 2; Wash. Post, supran. 2.
9. This is not the forum to discuss the sad reality that, using 1996 statistics,
196,511,000 of the United States citizens were eligible to vote, and only 146,211,960 were
registered (74.4%). Of that 146,211,960, only 96,456,345 in fact voted in the 1996
Presidential election. This indicates a turnout rate of 49.08%. About Elections and Voting
<http://www.fec.gov/pges/96T0.HTM> (accessed Sept. 12, 2001). Assuming about the
same rate of participation in 2000, this means that the President was elected with about
23% of those eligible to vote.
10. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. XII.
11. A small percentage, 3,000,000 of 101,000,000 or 3% voted for other candidates. The
World Almanac and Book of Facts 76 (World Almanac Educ. 2001).
12. Of course, under the United States Constitution, the voting citizens do not
technically vote for the President. Instead, they vote for "electors" from each state, who in
turn meet and vote for the President. Each state has electors equal to the number of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1: U.S.
Const. amend. XII. By specific Constitutional Amendment, the District of Columbia has
three electors. U.S. Const. amend. XXIII.
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the winner of the election.' 3
In the early evening of election day, the television networks and the
Associated Press, based on exit poll projections, declared Vice President
Gore the winner in the State of Florida. 14 Then, by the early morning of
November 8, 2000, all the pundits realized that they had made a
mistake.1 5
By 2:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, most analysts
predicted Governor Bush to win Florida and thus have a majority of the
electoral votes. Vice President Gore then called Bush to concede.16 Yet,
one hour later, after discussions with his advisors, and a tightening of
the vote count, Vice President Gore retracted his concession in a followup phone call to Governor Bush. 1 7 This ignited a thirty-six day postelection Presidential race.18
B.

Strategy and Litigation

Through public relations and selected court cases, the Presidential
Campaigns pursued two different strategies.
The Gore campaign
challenged the credibility of the voting tallies for certain areas of
Florida.' 9 The votes, they urged, had never really been counted and it
was necessary to allow recounting in certain areas to satisfy the
requirement that every vote be counted.20
Vice President Gore also
contended that undervotes (where a punchcard had not been totally
punched through) and overvotes (where two votes were cast for
President) should be reviewed manually to determine the "intent of the
voter. "2
The Bush Campaign relied on the official conclusion that the vote
had been counted, a new President had been selected, and the
opposition was merely trying to steal the election. 2
Florida law and

13. Wash. Post, supran. 2, at 43.
14. Id. atvii.
15. Wright, supran.2, at xv.
16. Wash. Post, supran. 2, at vii.
17. Wright, supra n. 2, at 3-4.
18. Simon, supra n. 2, at 256.
19. Vice President Gore has been criticized for seeking recounts and making challenges,
at least at first, in only selected counties. This selectivity, lawyers, professors, and
journalists argued, first raised Constitutional obstacles as the choice of Democratic
strongholds for recounts gave credence to arguments and then the later decision of the
Supreme Court based on "equal protection." It also made it "more difficult for Florida
Courts to fashion a timely remedy that the Supreme Court might have found more
tolerable." While it was true that he did ask for a statewide recount one month later (in a
televised address), this wasn't ever argued in court. In fact, Gore campaign lawyer, David
Bois, stated that they would "accept" a statewide recount but were not seeking it. David
Bastow & Adam Nsgourney, Gore's CriticalMistake, Failureto Ask for a Statewide Recount,
in 36 Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 PresidentialElection 331, 331-34 (John
Wright et al. eds., Times Books 2001). See Wash. Post, supran. 2, at 106.
20. Simon, supran. 2, at 258.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 257, 259-60.
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federal law had set deadlines.
Delays were nothing more than
obstructionist tactics by a sore loser.23
An important part of both teams' strategies included the filing of
and response to lawsuits.24 Florida law provides for automatic machine
recounts of machine ballots when the electoral differentials are 0.5% or
less 25 and allows candidates and political parties to request manual
recounts in other circumstances.2 6 It also provides for submission of all
voting returns no later than seven days after an election. 27 Since the
vote tally was less than 0.5%, an automatic machine recount was
undertaken. 2 8 As a result, the vote difference between Governor Bush
and Vice President Gore was reduced from 1,784 to 327.29
On November 9, the Florida Democratic Party and Vice President
Gore requested "hand" recounts of the votes in Volusia, Palm Beach,
Broward, and Miami-Dade counties.3 0 That same day, Palm Beach
County and Volusia County agreed to conduct hand recounts. 31 The
Florida Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, indicated that, recount or
no recount, Florida law required all county vote totals to be submitted by
November 14th (the seventh day) and that she would not waive this
requirement.3 2 On November 10, 2000, Broward County also agreed to
the hand recount, but only of a sample of the votes. 3
Though Vice President Gore threatened a court fight over
questionable ballots,"34 Governor Bush's campaign fired the first legal
shot in the federal courts on November 11, 2000. 3 5 There were two

23. Wright, supran. 2, at 336-46.
24. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 101.
Litigation was king. Before this was over, one firm-Steel Hector, representing
Katherine Harris [the Florida Secretary of State]-would handle 40 law suits over
36 days, plus appeals to the Florida Supreme Court, two cases before the 1 lth
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a couple of federal district court cases and two
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. One firm. There would be dozens of firms
involved before it was over.
ICL
25. Fla. Stat. § 102.141(4) (2000).
26. Fla. Stat. § 102.166(5) (2000).
27. Fla. Stat. § 102.111 (2000) provides that county voting returns must be submitted
by seven days to the Secretary of State after the election or they "shall be ignored." Fla.
Stat. § 102.112 (2000) states that they must be submitted or they "may be ignored."
Scheppele, supra n. 4, at 1396.
28. Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000).
29. Id.; Wright, supra n. 2, at 28. After overseas ballots were counted, the number rose
to 930 votes. Dionne & Kristol, supra n. 2, at xiii. At the time of certification, the
differential was 537. Gore v. Harris,772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000). At the time of the
remand by the Florida Supreme Court on December 8, 2000, the count was either 154 or
193, depending on the vote count in Palm Beach. Wright, supra n. 2, at 274.
30. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
31. Wash. Post, supran. 2, at vii-viii; Dionne & Kristol, supran. 2, at xi.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Wright, supra n. 2, at 14-15.
35. Wright, supra n. 2, at 39-43.
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directly opposite opinions from state officials on the validity of manual
recounts. The Secretary of State, a Republican, issued an opinion
stating that manual recounts were only allowable if fraud or machine
breakdown occurred, not merely because of a small statistical
issued an
inaccuracy.
The Florida Attorney General, a Democrat,
36
opinion that manual recounts were appropriate in all cases.
The Bush Campaign petitioned the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to block the manual recounts saying
that manual recounts were not appropriate for mere counting
inaccuracies.3 7 The motion was denied two days later. 38 The Court of
Appeals for Eleventh Circuit refused to allow an emergency injunction,
but granted the right to proceed. 39 The request for the preliminary
injunction was later denied. 40
Numerous lawsuits relating to the Presidential election were then
filed by Vice President Gore, predominant Democratic Florida county
canvassing (election) boards, the Democratic Party, and the GoreLieberman campaign in the Florida state courts. 4 1 Two became the
bases for appeals to the Florida Supreme Court and the eventual
between that court and the United States Supreme
confrontation
42
Court.
One lawsuit was filed before the votes were certified by the Florida
Elections Canvassing Commission, before Leon County Circuit Judge

36. Scheppele, supra n. 4, at 1401; Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 99-100. For the text of
the Opinion for the Department of State, see Dionne & Kristol, supra n. 2, at 9-10. For the
Advisory Legal Opinion of the Florida Attorney General, see Dionne & Kristol, supran. 2, at
14-18.
37. A parallel lawsuit filed in the Middle District of Florida seeking an injunction was
also denied. Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla. 2000). A request to
the Eleventh Circuit for an emergency injunction was also denied. Touchston v. McDermott,
234 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2000). The more formal request for a preliminary injunction was
denied on December 6, 2000. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (1lth Cir. 2000).
38. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
39. Siegel v. LePore,234 F.3d 1162 (1lth Cir. 2000).
40. Seigel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000). The Bush Campaign appealed both
the denial of the injunction in Siegel and the later decision of the Florida Supreme Court in
Palm Beach Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), which added seven
days to the time allowed for manual recounts. Infran. 59. Certiorari was denied in Siegel.
Selgel v. LePore,531 U.S. 105 (2000).
41. See e.g. Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000)
(validity of "butterfly" style ballot); Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d
519 (Fla. 2000); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000)
(absentee ballots).
42. The two tracks of litigation are sometimes confused. See e.g. Term in Review:
Elections: Justices Decide Landmark Cases on the Conduct of FederalElections, 70 L.W.
3081 (Aug. 7. 2001) (describing the Florida Supreme Court decision reviewing Leon County
Judge Sauls' denial of relief as being "on remand" from the United States Supreme Court
decision dealing with the appeal from Leon County Judge Lewis's decision). The confusion
became worse after the Florida Supreme Court overruled Judge Sauls. "Stung by the
reversal, [he] quickly removed himself from the case and the job of administering the order
fell to Judge Terry Lewis," the judge in the other major Bush v. Gore Florida litigation.
Wash. Post, supran. 2, at 200-0 1.
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Terry Lewis.43 This "Canvassing Board" case led to the United States
Supreme Court's first decision pertaining to the election on December 4,
2000. 44 Vice President Gore fied the second lawsuit pursuant to a
Florida statute, after certification of the vote tally on November 26, 2000,
before Leon County Circuit Judge N. Sanders Sauls.45 This is the "Bush
v. Gore" case that led to the final decision of the United States Supreme
Court on December 12, 2000.46
C.

CanvassingBoard Decision

As noted above, several county canvassing boards had ordered
manual recounts. The Florida Secretary of State had indicated that any
recounts must be completed by the statutory date for certification of the
election: November 14, 2000. 4 7
No exceptions were authorized. 48
Lawyers for Palm Beach and Volusia Counties immediately went to Leon
County state court, 49 asking that the court order the Secretary of State
to consider all votes counted, even if after the statutory certification
date. 50 On November 13, 2000, Judge Terry Lewis, of the Florida Circuit
Court for the Second Judicial Circuit, ruled that the deadline was
statutorily mandated and that Harris could therefore certify the results
on the date set in the statute. 5 ' However, Harris could not rule out late
returns without good reason, that is, after considering all the relevant
facts and circumstances before deciding.52
This decision was appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeals
on November 14, 2000. 5 3 Certified returns were then received by the
Secretary of State and, after rejecting reasons for exceptions claimed by
various counties, Harris certified those returns as final, except for
absentee ballots. 54 Representatives of the Gore campaign proceeded to
file a motion to compel the Secretary of State to allow and accept
amended returns.5 5
43. Volusia County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,No. CV 00-2700 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 14,
2000) (reprinted in Dionne & Kristol, supra n. 2, at 19-23).
44. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
45. Gore v. Harris,No. CV 00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (reprinted in Dionne &
Kristol, supran. 2, at 53).
46. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-02 (2000).
47. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 98.
48. Id. at 98-99.
49. Leon County is where the state capitol, Tallahassee, is located. The lawsuit was filed
there against the Secretary of State who resides in the state capitol.
50. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,772 So. 2d 1220, 1226 (Fla. 2000).
51. Id.
52. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 104; Volusia County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,No. CV 002700 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000).
53. This part of the factual history of the litigation comes from the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.

2000).
54. Id. at 1226-27.
55. Id. at 1227.
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On November 17, 2000, the Florida Circuit Court for the Second
Judicial Circuit ruled that the Secretary of State had properly exercised
her discretion and denied the motion.5 6 An appeal to the First District
Court of Appeals was then filed, consolidated with the November 14,
2000 appeal and certified to the Supreme Court of Florida for its "great
and "requir[ing] immediate resolution by the [Florida]
public importance"
57
supreme court."
An expedited procedure led to a decision by the Florida Supreme
Court on November 21, 2000.58 The Florida Supreme Court, in a
unanimous per curiam decision, reversed the orders of the trial court,
extended the deadline for certification by twelve days, and ordered the
manual recounts to continue until Saturday, November 26, 200 1. 9 The
"guiding principle," noted the Florida Supreme Court, is "the will of the
people, not a hypertechnical reliance upon statutory provisions. " 6° A
"statutory ambiguity" existed between provisions of Florida statutes.6 1 In
that circumstance, the right to vote, and the right of every voter to have
his or her tally count, means that a process securing the "intent of the
voter" -in this case, reviewing each ballot-must apply.62
The Bush Campaign then sought certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court which was granted on November 24, 2000.63
Oral argument was held on December 1, 2000, after the vote count
was to have been completed. 64 The Supreme Court issued its opinion on
December 4, 2000.65
In the per curiam opinion, the Court noted that ordinarily it would
defer to the State Court on the interpretation of a state statute.66 Here,
however, the state statute was implementing a federal Constitutional
provision, Article II, section 1 clause 2, which gives to the state
legislature the power of appointment of electors from that state to the

56. Id.
57. Id. at 1227 n. 7 (quoting Fla. Const. art. V, § (b)(5)).
58. Id. at 1220.
59. PalmBeach County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000).
60. Id. at 1227.
61. Id. at 1231.
62. IcL at 1231-34.
63. Though numerous issues were raised by Governor Bush, only two issues were
accepted for review:
[WIhether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing the
State's elector appointment procedures after election day, violated the Due
Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the decision of that court changed
the manner in which the State's electors are to be selected, in violation of the
legislature's power to designate the manner for selection under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 of
the United States Constitution.
Bush v. PalmBeach County CanvassingBd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000).
64. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).
65. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
66. Id. at 76.
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electoral college to vote for President. 7 The United States Supreme
Court was troubled by the possibility that the Florida Supreme Court did
not adequately consider how Article II constrained Florida law, including
6
how the Florida Constitution applies to elections for the President. 8
The Supreme Court was also troubled by the effect of other federal
law in 3 U.S.C. § 5, a "Safe Harbor" provision, which the Florida
Supreme Court failed to mention.6 9
That provision provides a
mechanism for presumptive validity of state election returns. If a state
has a procedure for the final selection of electors, including resolution of
all controversies, at least six days before
the date set for the meeting of
"7
electors, the selection is "conclusive. 0
Since § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality of
the State's determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before
the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the "safe harbor" would
counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might
deem to be a change in the law. 7 '
On balance, then, the per curiam opinion concluded that the wiser
course of action was to vacate and remand the judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court and instruct it to consider explicitly the impact of the
two federal provisions, one in the United States Constitution and one in
federal statutes, on its decision.72
D.

"Gore v. Harris"Decision

A separate track of litigation started the day after the vote in Florida
was certified by the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission. Vice
President Gore challenged the certification of Dade, Palm Beach, and
Nassau counties, arguing that recount votes should have been included
in the certified results for those counties. 73 On the day the United States
Supreme Court remanded the Canvassing Board decision to the Florida
67. Id. U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 2 provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress....
68. Bush, 531 U.S. at 77.
69. Id. at 77-78.
70. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). The statute provides in part:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been
made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination.., shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated....
Id.
71. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78.
72. Id.
73. Dionne & Kristol, supra n. 2, at 53.
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Supreme Court (December 4, 2000),7 4 Leon County Circuit Judge N.
Sanders Sauls denied the Gore contest of the certification.7 5 Sauls held
that Florida law requires a "reasonable probability" that the results of
the election would have been changed, which was not demonstrated. 6
Moreover, no "illegality, dishonesty, gross negligence, improper
influence, coercion, or fraud" was shown.7 Finally, in other areas, the
county canvassing boards had properly exercised their discretion. 78
The Gore campaign, of course, immediately appealed this case to
the District Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Florida
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court partly reversed Judge Sauls
on December 8, 2000 in a four to three decision. 9 In addition, it
ordered relief beyond the decision of Judge Sauls. 80
In reviewing the applicable law, the Florida Supreme Court viewed
its responsibility in interpreting Florida law, as required by the Florida
Constitution and statutes.8 '
The traditional process of the state's
highest court interpreting and applying the language of the legislature
was perfectly consistent with the federal constitutional provision that the
state legislature is to "direct" the "manner" of selection of electors. Thus,
the court was determining what "manner" the legislature meant in the
statutes.
The court then considered the specific items in the decision by
Judge Sauls and granted most and denied some. 3

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at xii.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 1247. The court noted:
Although we find that the appellants are entitled to reversal in part of the trial
court's order and are entitled to a manual count of the Miami-Dade County
undervote, we agree with the appellees that the ultimate relief would require a
counting of the legal votes contained within the undervotes in all counties where
the undervote has not been subjected to a manual tabulation. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Id.
81. Id. at 1248-49.
82. I& at 1268.
83. Id. at 1248.
The appellants' election contest is based on five instances where the official
results certified involved either the rejection of a number of legal votes or the
receipt of a number of illegal votes. These five instances... are as follows:
(1) The rejection of 215 net votes for Gore identified in a manual count by the
Palm Beach Canvassing Board as reflecting the clear intent of the voters. [The
court ordered these included.]
(2) The rejection of 168 net votes for Gore, identified in the partial recount by the
Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board. [The court ordered these included.]
(3) The receipt and certification after Thanksgiving of the election night returns
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The court based its reversals on a rejection of Judge Sauls' "abuse
of discretion" standard for review. 84 Florida law required a de novo
review of canvassing board decisions.8 5
The court proceeded to consider the contention of the Bush
campaign that a count of the undervotes (votes that were not counted
because the machine did not register them) in Miami-Dade would be
inappropriate without a similar count of all undervotes in the entire
state.86 It held that, technically under Florida statutes, a limited recount
was appropriate.8 7 However, to preserve the democratic principle that
the "will of the people" controls, as stated in Florida law and guaranteed
by both the Florida and United States Constitutions, 8 8 the court "agreed"
with the Bush campaign that:
[I]t is absolutely essential in this proceeding and to any final decision, that
a manual recount be conducted for all legal votes in this State, not only in
Miami-Dade County, but in all Florida counties where there was an
undervote, and, hence a concern that not every citizen's vote was
counted.89
The test for determining whether a vote should be counted-i.e.,
whether it was a "legal vote"-is the "intent of the voter."90 So long as a
review, whether by machine or by hand, can ascertain that intent, that
vote is legal and must be counted. 9 1
The majority accepted the deadline set by the federal Safe Harbor
statute, that all controversies must be resolved within six days before
the counting of electoral votes 92 (December 12, 2000)Y9 only five days
from the date of its decision. 94 It still believed that "with the cooperation
of the officials in all the counties, the remaining undervotes in these
from Nassau County, instead of the statutorily mandated machine recount
tabulation... resulting in an additional 51 net votes for Bush. [The court
affirmed the exclusion of these votes.]
(4) The rejection of an additional 3300 votes in Palm Beach County, most of which
Democrat observers identified as votes for Gore but which were notincluded in the
Canvassing Board's certified results[.] [The court affirmed the exclusion of these
votes.]
(5) The refusal to review approximately 9000 Miami-Dade ballots, which the
counting machine registered as non-votes and which have never been manually
reviewed. [The court ordered these votes to be manually examined.]
Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Gore v. Han-is, 772 So. 2d at 1248, 1252.
Id 1252.
Id.
Id at 1253.
Id at 1254.
Id. at 1253.
Gore v. Harris,772 So. 2d at 1256.
Id.
Supra nn. 68-70.
Wright, supran.2, at 160.
See Gore v. Harris,772 So. 2d at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
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"9
counties could be accomplished within the required time frame. 5

In his dissent,

Florida Chief Justice Wells 96 questioned

the

majority's broad decision. 97 He rejected the bases for the majority
decision under Florida law, was concerned about the need for finality
and the "constitutional crisis"
caused by prolonging the controversy, and
98
restraint.
judicial
for
called
Chief Justice Wells specifically referred to Article I, section 1,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution, and then reference to it by
the United States Supreme Court in its December 4, 2000 decision.9 9 He
contended that partial or total recounts ordered by a court are
inconsistent with that provision, which gives power to the state
legislature. 0 0 He also expressed concern about the lack of standards for
the manual vote counters to use. 101
Two other Florida justices dissented on the basis that even if Judge
Sauls had applied the improper standard of abuse of discretion, the Gore
campaign had "not carried [its] burden of showing that the number of
95. Id. at 1262 n. 22. The court continued:
We note that public officials in many counties have worked diligently over the
past thirty days in dealing with exigencies that have occurred because of this
unique historical circumstance arising from the presidential election of 2000. We
commend those dedicated public servants for attempting to make this election
process truly reflect the vote of all Floridians.
Id.
96. According to observers at oral argument, Chief Justice Wells felt "spanked" by the
United States Supreme Court in its December 4, 2000 decision, and felt that the Florida
Supreme Court ought to now pay attention to what the federal Justices were saying.
Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 192.
97. Id. The actual order for action by the lower court was quite specific:
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the final judgment
of the trial court dated December 4, 2000, and remand this cause for the circuit
court to immediately tabulate by hand the approximate 9,000 Miami-Dade
ballots, which the counting machine registered as non-votes, but which have
never been manually reviewed, and for other relief that may thereafter appear
appropriate. The circuit court is directed to enter such orders as are necessary to
add any legal votes to the total statewide certifications and to enter any orders
necessary to ensure the inclusion of the additional legal votes for Gore in Palm
Beach County and the 168 additional legal votes from Miami-Dade County.
Because time is of the essence, the circuit court shall commence the tabulation of
the Miami-Dade ballots immediately. The circuit court is authorized... to be
assisted by the Leon County Supervisor of Elections or its sworn designees.
Moreover, since time is also of the essence in any statewide relief that the circuit
court must consider, any further statewide relief should also be ordered forthwith
and simultaneously with the manual tabulation of the Miami-Dade undervotes.
In tabulating the ballots and in making a determination of what is a 'legal' vote,
the standards to be employed is that established by the Legislature in our
Election Code which is that the vote shall be counted as a 'legal' vote if there is
'clear indication of the intent of the voter.'
Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Gore v. Hamis, 772 So. 2d at 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id. at 1269.
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legal votes rejected by the canvassing boards is sufficient to change or
place in doubt the result of this statewide election."10

2

Moreover, a

statewide recount, which
is in any way accurate, would not be
0 3
realistically possible. 1

E.

"Bushv. Gore"-The Intervention

Plans for the statewide recount began almost immediately after the
Florida Supreme Court reversal. °4 The Bush campaign immediately
sought a stay from the United States Supreme Court. 0 5 That night,
Judge Terry Lewis, now handling the case on remand from the Florida
Supreme Court, 0 6 had started to organize the state-wide recount of
about 45,000 disputed ballots. 0 7 However, he set no specific standards
for the counters (and the party watchers looking
over their shoulders)
08
except for the "intent of the voters" standard. 1
The statewide recount began the next day.109 Then, at 2:30 p.m. on
December 9, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, retitling the case
"Bush v. Gore," ordered an immediate halt to the recount."0 Within a
half-hour, the recount had ceased. "' With the clock ticking on the "Safe
Harbor" deadline date of December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court
indicated it was treating the stay request as a petition for certiorari,
granting the petition, and setting oral argument for the morning of
December 11, 2000.112
The decision to grant the stay was by a five to four vote with no
majority opinion. 113

102. Id. at 1271 (Harding & Shaw, JJ., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1272. The majority forcibly responded to this argument in a footnote:
The dissents would have us throw up our hands and say that because of looming
deadlines and practical difficulties we should give up any attempt to have the
election of the presidential electors rest upon the vote of Florida citizens as
mandated by the Legislature. While we agree that practical difficulties may well
end up controlling the outcome of the election we vigorously disagree that we
should therefore abandon our responsibility to resolve this election dispute under
the rule of law. We can only do the best we can to carry out our sworn
responsibilities to the justice system and its role in this process. We, and our
dissenting colleagues, have simply done the best we can, and remain confident
that others charged with similar heavy responsibilities will also do the best they
can to fulfill their duties as they see them.
Id at 1261 n. 21.
104. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 200.
105. Id. at 203.
106. Supran. 46.
107. Wright, supra n. 2, at 275.
108. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 208-09.
109. Id. at210-11.
110. Id. at 211.
111. Id.
112. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (2000).
113. Id. at 512. By eliminating the dissenters, the "majority" consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
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Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter u 4 joined a vehement dissent
written by Justice Stevens, and Justice Scalia responded with a
concurrence. 115
The dissenters challenged the majority for its rejection of "three
rules of self-restraint," noting:
[1] On questions of state law, we have consistently respected the opinions
of the highest courts of the States.
[21 On questions whose resolution is committed at least in large measure
to another branch of the Federal Government, we have construed our own
jurisdiction narrowly and exercised it cautiously.
[3] On federal constitutional questions that were not fairly presented to the
court whose judgment is being reviewed, we have prudently declined to
express an opinion.
11 6

The majority has acted unwisely.

Justice Stevens stressed that no "irreparable harm" could possibly
be shown by "counting every legally cast vote" and that irreparable harm
was more likely because the stay might be "tantamount" to a decision on
the merits and "preventing the recount from being 1 7completed will
inevitably cast a cloud on the legitimacy of the election."
Justice Scalia responded by noting that a majority already believed
that "the petitioner has a substantial probability of success."" Here the
votes are of "questionable legality" and the "irreparable harm" is a "cloud
upon what (Governor Bush) claims to be the legitimacy of his
election."1 9 Moreover, letting the standard for the recount differ for each
county would "prevent an accurate recount from being conducted on a
proper basis later, since it is generally agreed that each manual recount
produces a degradation
of the ballots, which renders a subsequent
120
inaccurate."
recount
Oral argument was held on December 11, 2000.121 That same day,
the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in response to the
December 4, 2000 remand by the United States Supreme Court in the
Canvassing Board decision.1 22 It focused on the date of certification of
the county returns and whether later amended returns had to be

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
117. Id. at 513. Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times saw this statement by Stevens
as indicating he felt that there was a substantial risk that the stay was the equivalent of
deciding for Bush. Wright, supran. 2, at 277.
118. Bushy. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 512.
119. Id.
120. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Dionne & Kristol, supran.2, at xiv.
122. Id.
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accepted by the Secretary of State.

F.

"CanvassingBoard" Revisited

The Florida Supreme Court decided to release its opinion in Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board'24 in an effort to impact the United
125
States Supreme Court action in the related "Bush v. Gore" decision.
The six to one majority opinion12 6 again indicated that an ambiguity
existed in Florida law and that it was the responsibility of the Supreme
Court of Florida to resolve any ambiguities. 127 Thus, it was not making
new law, only interpreting existing law.12
Though the United States Constitution in Article II had given the
state legislators the responsibility to appoint electors, it must be in
accordance with state law.12 9 In Florida, the legislature had delegated
the power to appoint electors to the people of the state.13 0 It did not
establish different rules for election of the President and for other
elections. 131
As to the "Safe Harbor" provision of federal law, use of that
provision was within the discretion of the state legislature and therefore
Florida law, setting procedures for elections and for resolving

123. Supra nn. 47-62.
124. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,772 So. 2d 1273 (2000).
125. Id at 1279 n. 2.
In its December 4, 2000, opinion and mandate, the Supreme Court of the United
States remanded this case for further proceedings. On December 4, 2000, this
Court entered its order authorizing.., supplemental briefs.., and briefs were
filed on December 5, 2000, and considered by the Court. In the interim, this
Court received briefs and conducted oral argument on December 7, 2000, in the
case of Gore v. Harris, which also required immediate attention. We thereafter
rendered our decision [in that case] on December 8, 2000, which is presently
under review by the Supreme Court of the United States. While recognizing the
dissent in this case does not agree with release of this opinion at this time, we
have issued this decision as expeditiously as possible... in order to timely
respond to the questions presented by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the December 4, 2000, opinion and its remand instructions.
Id.
126. Chief Justice Wells dissented saying the court should not issue an opinion "while the
United States Supreme Court has under consideration Bush v. Gore...." I&. at 1292.
127. Id. at 1282.
Based on this Court's status as the ultimate arbiter of conflicting Florida law, we
conclude that our construction of the above statutes results in the formation of
no new rules of state law but rather results simply in a narrow reading and
clarification of those statutes, which were enacted long before the present election
took place. We decline to rule more expansively in the present case, for to do so
would result in this Court substantially rewriting the Code. We leave that matter
to the sound discretion of the body best equipped to address it, the Legislature.
Id. at 1291.
128. SeeWright, supran.2, at 299.
129. Id.
130. CanvassingBcL, 772 So. 2d at 1281-82.
131. Id. at 1291.
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controversies. 132 However, if a risk existed that applying Florida law
might result in loss of the right of Florida voters to "fully participate in
federal elections, a strict timetable may be applied." 33
The Florida Supreme Court then reviewed Florida law and
ambiguities among statutory provisions. The Secretary of State could
certify by the date set by Florida law, but must accept amended returns
when it was necessary to insure "having each vote counted. " 13 4 Again,
some limitation of that general rule may be appropriate in elections for
the President, under the "Safe Harbor" provision, to avoid a risk to
Florida's citizens that their votes might not be counted. 13s
II.

BUSH V. GORE-THE FINAL CHAPTER

After oral argument before the United States Supreme Court on
December 11, 2000, many expected, and the Gore campaign hoped for,
an opinion that day or at least early the next day, with the possibility
that a recount could continue at least until the "Safe Harbor" deadline
on December 12, 2000. Yet, the actual decision was not released until
after 10:00 p.m. on December 12, 2000.136
A.

The Action

The Supreme Court, of course, was considering only the appeal in
Gore v. Harris. 37 But it also now had the new Florida Supreme Court
opinion in CanvassingBoarcL Therefore, all issues were before it.' 38 The
unsigned majority opinion indicated that it felt bound by the Florida
Court's decision accepting the deadline date of December 12, under the
discuss any of the
"Safe Harbor" provision,13 9 but otherwise did not
40
issues in either Florida Supreme Court decision.
The Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the
132. Id.at 1282.
133. Id. at 1282, 1289.
134. Id. at 1291.
135. Id.
136. Wash. Post, supran. 2, at 224-27; Wright, supran. 2, at 304.
137. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101-04 (2000).
138. See text and discussion at supra nn. 124-35. See also Bush, 531 U.S. at 118 n. 2
(concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist citing the December 11th Florida Supreme
Court CanvassingBoard decision).
139. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted
the time limitation set by the "Safe Harbor" language in 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). The state
legislature wanted the deadline date of December 12, 2000 to apply. That date, said Chief
Justice Rehnquist, was to include all possible appeals .... " Bush, 531 U.S. at 120-22
(Rehnquist, Breyer, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Cf. id. at 130 (Souter, J.,
dissenting: "[N]o State is required to conform to § 5." It is each state's choice and "the
sanction for failing to satisfy the conditions of § 5 is simply loss of what has been called its
'safe harbor.' And even that determination is to be made, if made anywhere, in the
Congress."). See id. at 143-44 (Ginsburg & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id. at 153-58 (Breyer,
Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
140. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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matter "for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion."
After reviewing the opinion, Vice President Gore conceded on December
13, 2000.142 On December 14, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court, on
remand, dismissed the case entitled "Gore v. Harris. " 1 4 3 On December
18, the Electoral College voted and Governor Bush won the election with
271 votes to Vice President Gore's 266 votes. 144
Like the decision to stay the recount ordered on December 9, 2000,

14 1. Id- at 111.

142. Wright, supran.2, at310-11.
143. On December 14th, the Florida Supreme Court entered its "Order on Remand." Gore
v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000). The Order cited the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court and stated that:
On the date of the subject election, the Florida Election Code did not provide the
elements necessary for a resolution of the disputed issues, based on the
constitutional parameters expressed by the United States Supreme Court.
Accordingly, relief cannot be granted, and this case is dismissed. Opinion may
follow.
Id. at 270.
The actual opinion was released on December 22, 2000. Gore v. Harris,773 So.
2d 524 (Fla. 2000). The per curiamopinion expanded on its order by stating that for a
manual recount to occur:
[The Supreme Court's opinion] would require not only the adoption (after
opportunity for argument) of adequate statewide standards for determining what
is a legal vote, and practicable procedures to implement them, but also orderly
judicial review of any disputed matters that might arise. In addition, the
Secretary of State has advised that the recount of only a portion of the ballots
requires that the vote tabulation equipment be used to screen out undervotes, a
function for which the machines were not designed. If a recount of overvotes were
also required, perhaps even a second screening would be necessary. Use of
equipment for this purpose, and any new software developed for it,
would have to
be evaluated for accuracy by the Secretary of State, as required by [Florida law]
The Supreme Court ultimately mandated that any manual recount be concluded
by December 12, 2000.... In light of the time of the release of the Supreme
Court opinion, these tasks and this deadline could not possibly be met. Moreover,
upon reflection, we conclude that the development of a specific, uniform standard
necessary to ensure equal application and to secure the fundamental right to vote
throughout the State of Florida should be left to the body we believe best
equipped to study and address it, the Legislature.
Accordingly, pursuant to the direction of the United States Supreme Court, we
hold appellants can be afforded no relief.
Id. at 526.
The Florida Chief Justice felt the per curiam decision was too defensive and so
concurred in the result only. Id. at 527 (Wells, C.J., concurring). A concurrence by
Florida Justice Shaw recited the chronological history of the case, questioned whether
any date of finality is relevant except January 6 of 2001, when Florida is obligated
under federal law, 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) to deliver its votes to Congress, hints at
partisanship, but still assures all that "the basic principles of our democracy are
intact." Id. at 527-30 (Shaw, J., concurring). Florida Justice Pariente also concurred,
urging reform of Florida law as to election contests and as to manual recounts,
although believing that a recount could have been completed in a fair and equitable
manner, had the United States Supreme Court not intervened. Id. at 530 (Pariente,
J., concurring).
144. Dionne & Kristol, supra n. 2. at xiv.
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14 5
the Supreme Court's December 12, 2000 decision was per curiamL
Since there was a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas146 and dissenting opinions by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, 147 it is clear that the "swing
votes" were the silent Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. 148

B.

The Basis-EqualProtection

The majority decided the case on equal protection grounds, holding
that, essentially, the state court failed to set "specific rules" for "uniform
treatment" of contested ballots, which led to "arbitrary and disparate
treatment" of the voters instead of equal weight. 49 The Constitution
provides that once a state grants its citizens the right to vote for
Presidential electors, it cannot, "by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." 50 Here, the
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was too arbitrary. By
setting no standards other than "the intent of the voter," the Florida
decision led to "unequal evaluation of ballots in various respects."' 5 '
Intent must52 be based on "specific rules designed to ensure uniform
"1
treatment.
Arbitrariness was demonstrated by the actions already taken by the
Florida Supreme Court in allowing recount totals from different counties,
each of3 which "used varying standards to determine what was a legal
5

vote."'

In addition, differing treatment of undervotes and overvotes was
applied.' 54 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court "did not specify who
would recount the ballots." 5 5 As a result, different county canvassing
boards pulled together ad hoc teams of judges "with no previous training
in handling and interpreting the ballots."5 6
The per curiam opinion concluded with a limiting series of
comments. "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances,

145. Bush. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
146. Id. at 111.
147. There were four dissenting opinions: (1) Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg; (2) Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens and Justice
Ginsburg in part; (3) Justice Ginsburg, joined Justice Stevens and in part by Justices
Souter and Breyer, and (4) Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens,
and Souter. Id. at 123, 129, 135, 144.
148. Wash. Post, supran. 2, at 229.
149. Term in Review: JusticesDecide Landmark Cases on the Conduct of FederalElections,
70 L.W. 3081, 3082 (Aug. 7, 2001).
150. Bush 531 U.S. at 104-05.
151. Id. at 106.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 107.
154. Id
155. Id. at 109.
156. Bush 531 U.S. at 109.
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for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities."157 There is no intent to specify specific
rules as "local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop
different systems for implementing elections. " 158 But here, the "situation
[is one] where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has
ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards. When
a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some
assurance that the rudimentary requirements
of equal treatment and
159
fundamental fairness are satisfied."

Here, a need existed for "substantial additional work" to comply
with the requirements of equal protection and, yet, the Florida Supreme
Court had indicated its desire to comply with the "Safe Harbor"
provision, requiring a0 final decision by December 12, 2000, the date the
opinion was issued. 16

Therefore, as "it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the
December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have
discussed, [the Court reversed] the judgment
of the Supreme Court of
16 1
Florida ordering a recount to proceed."

As indicated by the per curiam opinion, seven Justices believed that
the Florida procedure had equal protection problems. Aside from the
five votes indicated by the majority decision, Justices Souter and Breyer
indicated equal protection concerns. They still dissented, however, as
they believed the remedy of the majority constituted an inappropriate
usurpation of state authority and was "out of proportion to the asserted
harm."162 Justice Breyer wrote:
An appropriate remedy would be, instead, to remand this case with
instructions that, even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme
Court to require recounting all undercounted votes in Florida... whether
or not previously recounted prior to the end of the protest period, and to
do so in accordance with a single-uniform substandard.
Whether there is time to conduct a recount prior to December 18, when
the electors are scheduled to meet, is a matter for the state courts to
determine. And whether, under Florida law, Florida could or could not
take further
action is obviously a matter for Florida courts, not this Court,
63
to decide. 1

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The per curiam opinion rejects Justice Breyer's "proposed remedy-remanding to the
Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest until December
18" as it would be against the intent of the Florida legislature as indicated by the Florida
Supreme Court to seek the "safe harbor benefits" of federal law. Id. at 111.
161. Id. atll0.
162. Bush, 531 U.S. at 147 (Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
163. Id. at 146-47.
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Justice Souter similarly asserted that accepting that an equal protection
problem existed:
It is an issue that might well have been dealt with adequately by the
Florida courts if the state proceedings had not been interrupted, and if not
disposed of at the state level it could
164 have been considered by the
Congress in any electoral vote dispute.
The differences that existed between counties were arbitrary, but
the remedy was remand:
to the courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform standards
for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing
treatments, to be applied within and among counties when passing on
such identical ballots in any further recounting (or successive recounting)
that the courts might order.
Unlike the majority, I see no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida
could not possibly comply with this requirement before the date set for the
meeting of electors, December 18.... To recount these manually would
be a tall order, but before this Court stayed the effort to do that the courts
of Florida were ready to do their best to get that job done. There is no
justification for denying
the State the opportunity to try to count all
16 5
disputed ballots now.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens rejected the equal protection
argument totally. Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that the "intent of
the voter" standard is no less arbitrary
than many other legal doctrines,
166
doubt."
reasonable
a
"beyond
as
such
Moreover, allowing differing counties to have different standards is
no more a violation of equal protection than the delegation by state
legislatures to counties as to voting systems and ballot design. 167 And,
there will be some consistency as "a single impartial magistrate will
68
ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process."1
Justice Ginsburg was more blunt in stating that we live "in an
imperfect world," and the issue therefore is not really equal protection,
but rather who makes the decision. 169 Here, the Florida Supreme Court
has spoken and "I cannot agree that the recount adopted by the Florida
court, flawed as it may be, would yield a result any
less fair or precise
70
than the certification that preceded that recount."1

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 125 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 126.
Bush 531 U.S. at 126.
Id. at 143.
Id. (Ginsburg & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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The "Non-Issue"-ThePower to Select Electors

In remanding the Canvassing Board case, the Supreme Court
indicated that it was concerned about the interference of the Florida
Supreme Court in the decision of the legislature to choose electors, in
accordance with Article II, section 1, clause 2. 17 On remand, the Florida
Supreme Court assumed that it had the right to interpret what the
Florida legislature meant in various statutes dealing with the selection of
electors. Applying legislative intent was perfectly consistent with the
Constitutional language that "[elach State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors ....
The
Florida Supreme Court was merely
interpreting
the
"manner"
that
the
173
"directed."
had
legislature
state
In Bush v. Gore, the per curiam opinion did not consider the Article
II issue. 74 However, as the concurrence and the dissents did give the
issue some treatment, we have the positions of at least seven of the
75
Justices on this issue. 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
indicated that Article II, section 1, clause 2 provided that the legislature
has the exclusive right to define the method of appointment of
electors. 176 Here, the legislature has delegated power over the election to
the Secretary of State, and the Florida Supreme Court did not have the
authority to "alter[] ... by judicial interpretation.., the statutorily
provided apportionment of responsibility among these various bodies." 77
All the dissenters disagreed and in fact argued that this issue is not
even substantial.178 Justice Stevens stated their position.17 9 The states,
acting through their legislatures, establish in statutes the procedures for
selection of Presidential electors. That power is confirmed by Article II of
the federal Constitution. However,
[w]hen questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including election
laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest courts
of the States as providing the final answers. On rare occasions, however,
either federal statutes or the Federal Constitution may require federal
80
judicial intervention in state elections. This is not such an occasion1

171. Suprann. 67-68.
172. U.S. Const. art. If, § 1, cl. 2.
173. Suprann. 127-35.
174. See Posner, supra n. 2, at 5 (indicating that applying Article II would have been more
legitimate and less criticized basis for the decision).
175. See suprarm. 146-47.
176. Bush, 531 U.S. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
177. Id. at 114.
178. Term in Review: JusticesDecide Landmark Cases on the Conduct of FederalElections,
70 L.W. 3081, 3082-83 (Aug. 7, 2001).
179. Bush, 531 U.S. at 123.
180. Id.
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Here, the Florida Supreme Court, in fulfilling its obligation, was
interpreting Florida law and inconsistent provisions of Florida law, and
with, and indeed contemplated by, the
this role was "wholly consistent
"
grant of authority in Article I. 181
Separate opinions by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
reaffirmed the idea that no Article II issue existed at all. Statutes, said
Justice Souter, including election statutes, "require interpretation, which
does not, without more affect the legislative character of a statute within
the meaning of [Article II of] the Constitution."18 2 Here, the Florida
Supreme Court "engaged in permissible construction [of election
statutes]." l 3 The intent of the framers in Article II, said Justice
Ginsburg, was that "the judiciary would construe legislative
enactments."1 8 4
It is not necessary to spend much time on the criticisms and
supporters of the concurring opinions as to the application of Article II.
The political/legal reality is that concurring Justices did not get the two
swing Justices on the issue. The impact of Article II, section 1, clause 2
on future cases is therefore unknown.
Judge Posner and Professor Epstein are the biggest defenders of
applying Article II instead of equal protection to resolve the dispute. The
final authority, they urge, under that Constitutional provision, resides in
Supreme Court
the state legislature and indicates that the Florida
85 The dissenters, 186
overstepped its authority by interpreting it as it did.
Professor Dershowitz' 87 and others,188 indicate that it is the historic
function of the judiciary to interpret state law and all the Florida Court
did was exercise its traditional function. 8 9 In fact, they urge that the
181. Id. at 124. Justice Stevens wrote:
Article II provides that 'each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the

Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.' It does not create state
legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they come-as creatures
born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions. The legislative power in
Florida is subject to judicial review pursuant to Article V of the Florida
Constitution, and nothing in Article II of the Federal Constitution frees the state
legislature from the constraints in the state constitution that created it. Moreover,
the Florida Legislature's own decision to employ a unitary code for all elections
indicates that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play the same role in
Presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral disputes.
Id.
182. Id. at 130-31 (Souter, Breyer, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
183. Bush, 531 U.S. at 133 (Souter, Breyer, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
184. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
185. Posner, supra n. 2, at 111-14, 151-62; Richard A. Epstein, "In Such a Manneras the
Legislature ThereofMay Direct-" The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
613, 620 (2001).
186. Suprann. 183-84.
187. Dershowitz, supran. 2, at 129.
188. See e.g. Joseph M. Fisher, A PoliticalCase Makes Bad Law, 23 Natl. L.J. (Jan. 8,
2001).
189. This is, of course, the argument made by the Florida Supreme Court itself in its
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concurrents violated their own individual histories by not deferring to
federalism.19 0
D.

Federalism

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
indicated that "[in most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel
us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That
practice reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are
definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns. " 19'
Here, however, the Court was dealing not with an ordinary election, but
with an election for the President of the United States. It could not avoid
the issue, but instead had to address the specific Constitutional issue. 192
In fact, in choosing to interpret a federal constitutional provision and not
accepting the interpretation of the state Supreme Court, it was not
acting contrary to federalism principles, but rather enhancing
federalism
3
by giving the state legislature its rightful authority. 19
The primary response to the Chief Justice came from Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter. Ginsburg
attacked the Chief Justice's concurrence as a direct insult to federalism,
arguing that even if she disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court, it is
not the role of United States Supreme Court Justices to interpret Florida
law. 194 "There is no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's
high court have done less than 'their mortal best to discharge their oath
of office,'
and no cause to upset their reasoned interpretation of Florida
19 5
law."

decision on the remand of the Canvassing Board case. See text and discussion at supra
nn. 124-35.
190. E.J. Dionne, Jr., So Much for States' Rights, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the
Commentary 287 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
191. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, Scalia &Thomas, JJ., concurring).
192. Id. at 114.
In any election but a Presidential election, the Florida Supreme Court can give as
little or as much deference to Florida's executives as it chooses, so far as Article II
is concerned, and this Court will have no cause to question the court's actions.
But, with respect to a Presidential election, the court must be both mindful of the
legislature's role under Article II in choosing the manner of appointing electors
and deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry
out its constitutional mandate.
Id.
193. Id. at 115-16.
This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for
the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach definitive
weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is
whether the court has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to
abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II.
Id. (emphasis in original)
194. Bush, 531 U.S. at 136 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
195. Id.
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Just as the Court defers to administrative agencies, unless they
violate the clear intent of Congress, federalism demands that the Court
show equal "respect... to a state high court's interpretation of its own
state's law."' 96 In fact, it is not uncommon to "let stand state-court
" 197
interpretations of federallaw with which [the Court] might disagree.
This case is a break from past practice where the Court
"appropriately recognize[s] that [it] acts as an "'outsider' lacking the
common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the
jurisdiction."198 In fact, it is the highly, highly unusual case where the
United States Supreme Court rejects "outright" an interpretation of state
law by a state high court. 199
20 0
Justice Ginsburg concluded:
The extraordinary setting of this case has obscured the ordinary principle
that dictates its proper resolution: Federal courts defer to state high
courts' interpretations of their state's own law. This principle reflects the
core of federalism, on which all agree. "The Framers split the atom of
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have
two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from
incursion by the other." THE CHIEF JUSTICE's solicitude for the Florida
Legislature comes at the expense of the more fundamental solicitude we
owe to the legislature's sovereign. Were the other [m]embers of this Court
as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they
201
would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens also expressed his concern that the Court flouted
acceptable federalism principles in its decision. The majority of the
Supreme Court gave credence "to an unstated lack of confidence in the
impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical
decisions if the vote count were to proceed." 20 2 Justice Breyer's dissent
similarly criticized the concurrence as giving mere lip service to
federalism, arguing that it essentially "second-guessed" the state court
when it resolved conflicts among state statutes. 0 3
III. THE DEFENSES AND CRITICISMS
My critique will focus solely on two issues: the conflict between

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 138-39 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg pointed to many incidents where the Supreme Court, unsure of the meaning of a
state statute or set of statutes, "certifies" that issue to the state supreme court. Id.
199. Id. at 140-41. Justice Ginsburg noted that the only exceptions involved early cases
establishing federal supremacy over state law (like Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304
(1816)) and then in the 1950's and 1960's civil rights cases in the South. Id.
200. Bush, 531 U.S. at 142-43 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 128 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
203. Id. at 149 (Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
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equal protection and federalism, and the method of
the Court, particularly the stays and timing of its
focus directly on allegations and counter-allegations
the "partisan nature" of these decisions. However,
some general comments about this dialogue.2 °4
A.

decision-making by
actions. I will not
of "politics" and on
I do want to make

Partisanship

All during the judicial process, the judges of the state courts and
then the Justices of the United States Supreme Court were attacked for
partisanship. °5 Before the Justices accepted an appeal and issued a
stay in the Canvassing Board case, many pundits believed that the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court would find some way to
avoid this highly political case.20 6 When the Court proceeded to decide
it, pundits then worried about the "credibility" of the Court in the
future. 207 Others defended the decision as bringing a difficult election
process to a close and suggested that there would be no real long-term

204. Professor Dershowitz and Judge Posner have written two books presenting two
contrasting views as to the Bush v. Gore decision. Posner, supra n. 2; Dershowitz, supran.
2. See Ethan Bronner, Posner v. Dershowitz, N.Y. Times Book Rev. 11-12 (Jul. 15, 2001).
This was then followed by an extremely interesting and combative Intemet "dialogue"particularly as to partisanship and politics and the decision. Alan M. Dershowitz &
Richard
A.
Posner,
The
Supreme
Court
and
the
2000
Election
<http://slate.msn.com/code/story/actions/.. .%2F01%2D07%D02%2Fdialogues%2Exml
&iMsg=1> (accessed July 9, 2001).
205. Frank Bruni, Bush Camp Angrily Vows to Fight[FloridaSupreme Court]Ruling, in 36
Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 PresidentialElection 127, 127-28 (John Wright
et al. eds., Times Books 2001); Richard L. Berke, Angry Republicans Vow BitterFight, in 36
Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 PresidentialElection 268, 268-69 (John Wright
et al. eds., Times Books 2001); Richard L. Berke, Stunned DemocratsAttack [United States
Supreme] Court's Decision, in 36 Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000 Presidential
Election 281, 281-82 (John Wright et al. eds., Times Books 2001); William Glaberson, Legal
Scholars Question Supreme Court's Role, in 36 Days: The Complete Chronology of the 2000
PresidentialElection 346, 346-47 (John Wright et al. eds., Times Books 2001); Richard
Lowry, Why the Restraint?,in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 189 (E.J.
Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001); Charles Krauthammer,
Our ImperialJudiciary: We Need to Bring a Gavel Down on Arrogant Judges Like Florida's
Supremes, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 206, 206-08 (E.J.
Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001); Ronald Brownstein.
Blocking Vote Count High Court Shows Which Team It's Routing For, in Bush v. Gore: The
Court Cases and the Commentary 266, 266-69 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds.,
Brookings Instn. Press 2001); Eric Foner, PartisanshipRules, in Bush v. Gore: The Court
Cases and the Commentary 293, 293-94 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings
Instn. Press 2001).
206. See Nelson Lund, An Act of Courage, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the
Commentary 319 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001)
(reviewing what was expected and praising the Court for its "courage" in rejecting those
expectations); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Many Faces of Equal Treatment, 8 Preview 428, 430
(Aug. 2, 2001); Scheppele, supran. 4, at 1406.
207. Max Boot, Rule of Law: Law Professors v. the Supreme Court, Wall St. J. A13 (Aug.
13, 2001). But see James Blumstein & Suzanna Sherry, The 2000 PresidentialElection:
What Happens When Law and Politics Collide? Vanderbilt Law. 18, 18-27 (Spring 2001);
Paul Star, The Betrayal, Am. Prospect 4 (Jan. 1-15, 2001); Richard Rorty, in What We'll
Remember in 2050:9 Views on Bush v. Gore, Chron. Higher Educ. B 16 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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impact on the public's confidence in the Court. 0
The Justices themselves also focused on this issue. Dissenting
Justice Breyer compared the majority decision to the actions of Supreme
Court Justice Bradley in resolving the Presidential election of 1876. In
the 1876 election, there was an electoral contest because three states
sent two slates of electors to Washington. °9
Congress appointed a
fifteen person electoral commission, which included five Justices.2 10
Supreme Court Justice Bradley issued the ultimate deciding
vote.2 Breyer noted that:

[Tihe participation in the work of the electoral commission by five Justices,
including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it
assure the public that the process had worked fairly, guided by the law.
Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict,
212
thereby undermining respect for the judicial process.
He went on to state:
[Albove all, in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split
decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the Court
itself. That confidence is a public treasure. It has been built slowly over
many years, some of which were marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of
segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful effort to
protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself ... [Wie do risk a
self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just the Court, but the
Nation.213
In his dissent, Justice Stevens was more blunt:
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the
wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today's decision. One
thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know with complete
certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the

208. Harvey J. Mansfield, in What We'll Remember in 2050: 9 Views on Bush v. Gore,
Chron. Higher Educ. B15 (Jan. 5, 2001); Michael Doff, Was the Bush v. Gore Decision
Political?Colum. L. Sch. Rpt. 22-25 (Spring 2001).
209. Bush, 531 U.S. at 156.
210. Id.
211. Justice Breyer noted that Bradley was sharply attacked, though later shown to be
honest and impartial, and to have based his decision on legitimate legal principles - one of
which was that "Congress [should not] go behind election returns [but rather] accept them
as certified by state authorities." See Bush, 531 U.S. at 156-57 (Breyer, Ginsburg &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (citing and quoting from Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 185 (Yale U. Press 1962)). Professor Kmiec
criticizes this reference to the election of 1876, arguing that, in 1876, the Justices
participated in an "extra-judicial capacity" on a Commission. By contrast, here they
participated pursuant to their regular duties. Kmiec, supran. 206, at 432.
212. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
213. Id. at 157-58.
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2 14
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."

In response, the per curiam opinion defended itself:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
the members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the
Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people,
through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending
parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the
judicial system has been forced to confront.215
Perhaps the most vocal spokesperson attacking the Bush v. Gore
decision as "partisan" and decrying the implications of that partisanship
is Professor Alan Dershowitz in his book, "Supreme Injustice."2 16 The
language he uses is direct and stark:
The five Justices who ended election 2000... have damaged the
credibility of the U.S. Supreme Court and their lawless decision...
promises to have a more enduring impact on Americans than the outcome
2 17
of the election itself.
In so voting, they [the five vote majority] shamed themselves and the Court
on which they serve, and they defiled their places in history.218
[There is... widespread public outrage at what the high court did...
[and when the Court members] act in an unprincipled and partisan
manner-as they did in Bush v. Gore-they risk losing respect and
frittering away the moral capital of accumulated by their predecessors over
generations.2 19
It is naive to believe that there will be any lasting impact on public
confidence in the Judiciary because of its decision in Bush v. Gore.22 °
Even outrageous decisions, such as those on slavery,
segregation 22
2
2
3
and Japanese-American internment,
which have been universally
condemned,22 4 did not lead to a permanent disrespect to the Court.225

214. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
215. Id. at 111 (per curiam).
216. Dershowitz, supran.2, at3.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 4.
219. Id. at 5-6.
220. A recent article in the Judicature reported on a survey that showed the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore had only a modest influence on the public's perceptions
and knowledge of the Court. Herbert Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public
Perceptionsof the Supreme Court, 85 Judicature 1, 32 (July-Aug. 2001).
221. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
222. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
223. Korematzu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
224. See Bernard Schwartz, A Book of Legal Lists 69, 70-72, 76-78 (Oxford U. Press 1997)
(listing these cases as three of the 'Ten Worst Supreme Court Decisions").
225. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 776-778
(2001).
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Other decisions which caused deep splits in the public response, such
226
227
21
as those on abortion,2 26 school prayer,
and suspect rights,228 may have
22 9
0
led to anger,
attempts to "rein in the Court,"
and debates on
selection of future Justices.2 3 l They did not, however, lead to a
wholesale rejection of the legitimacy of the Court.
As a result of the decision, there may be some partisan bickering
and heavy questioning of future Supreme Court nominees along with
some lingering resentment. 232 But the public
and the bar want the
2 33
Court to have credibility and they will give it.
On a philosophic level, the decision in Bush v. Gore will be seen as
just another example of the real world.23 4 Are the Justices of the
Supreme Court political? Are the Justices ideological? Are the Justices
biased toward certain people, ideas, and perspectives?23 5 Surprise,
23 6

surprise

Traditional scholars, legal realists, critical legal scholars, and postmodernists can all agree that decisions, even or especially those of the
United States Supreme Court, are not based on fixed precedents and
226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
227. Abington Sch. DisL v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
228. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
229. Martin H. Belsky, The Burger Court & Criminal Justice: A Counter-Revolution in
Expectations, in The Burger Court. Counter-Revolution or Confirmation? 131 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., Oxford U. Press 1998); Martin H. Belsky, Antt-disestablishmentarianism- The
Religion Clauses at the End of the Millennium, 33 Tulsa L.J. 93 (1997); Martin H. Belsky,
Privacy:The Rehnquist Court's Unmentionable "Right,"36 Tulsa L.J. 43 (2000).
230. See Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (discussing congressional attempts to
overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
231. Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents,and Senators:A History of the U.S. Supreme
CourtAppointmentsfrom Washington to Clinton317 (Rowan & Littlefield 1999).
232. Tony Mauro, JusticesDouble-Team Circuit,Leg. Times 8, 10 (May 21, 2001).
233. See Kmiec, supra n. 206, at 432 (quoting Yale Professor Paul Kahn: "The rule of law
is our national myth. We must believe the myth if we are to overcome our political
disagreements.... [We point] to our faith in law and the institutional locus of that faith is
the [United States] Supreme Court."); Mark A. Aronchich & Stephen A. Sheller, Butterflies,
Chads andAmerican History, Phila. Law. 23-26, 57 (Spring 2001).
234. See Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 682
(2001), stating:
There is nothing inherently untoward about a polarized Supreme Court, by which
I mean a Court whose members line up repeatedly and often predictably in
opposing wings having stable memberships. To find something amiss in that
would be to eject ideology from constitutional adjudication in a way that can only
be called wrongheaded in light of our countiy's long experience with this form of
public decisionmaking ....
[GIrownup Americans accept the ideological
difference as unavoidable fact.
Id.
235. See Dershowitz, supra n. 2, at 9 (quoting Justice Scalia in an article he wrote as a
professor).
236. See Kmiec, supra n. 206, at 432 (quoting Yale Professor Paul Kahn: "[We can always
find the politician behind the robes of the justice."); Jonathan Groner, Will Election Case Do
Damage to the Judiciary?Leg. Times 15 (Dec. 18, 2000); Jonathan Ringel, What the High
CourtsSays When It Votes 5-4, Leg. Times 14 (Dec. 18, 2000) (noting that majority in Bush
v. Gore is the same majority in half of the split decisions of the Court).
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doctrines but include the judge's history and personality." 7 My now
deceased colleague, Chapman Professor Bernard Schwartz, documented
this in his books reviewing drafts of Supreme Court opinions.2 38
Here, supposed "states rights" Justices overruled a state's highest
239
court.
Justices who had not been proponents of voters' rights urged a0
24
new application of equal protection to safeguard such rights.
Supposed activist judges urged restraint and even avoidance 241 whereas
individual and federal rights proponents argued for acceptance of a state
decision rejecting claims of equal protection.24 2 If there was bias, argued
others, it was the partisanship of the Florida courts. 2 43 To quote my
favorite legal scholar, Yogi Berra, in this and in most situations: "Where
you stand, depends on where you sit."
That said, we should expect, and did in fact receive, partisanship.
Now, let's move on to the bases of the Court's actions and their
legitimacy.
B.

Equal Protection and Federalism

It is not surprising, from a "small p" political point of view, 2 4 why
the majority of the Supreme Court chose to rest its decision on equal
protection grounds. First, only three Justices who joined the majority
were willing to use Article II, section 2 as a basis for the decision. All the
dissenters urged that the issue was not even substantial. 245 Two of the
Justices, O'Connor and Kennedy, obviously felt uncomfortable about
237. See Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror 270 (1989); David Kairys, Introduction, in The
Politics of Law: A Progressive Technique 4-5 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed., Pantheon Books
1998); Richard Posner, Overcoming Law 387-405 (Harv. U. Press 1995); Stephen Feldman,
Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyers Toolbox, 85 Va. L. Rev. 151, 161
(1999).
238. Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court (Oxford U. Press
1985); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Burger Court (Oxford U. Press
1988); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Rehnquist Court (Oxford U.
Press 1996).
239. See Linda Greenhouse, Another Kind of Bitter Split, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases
and the Commentary 296, 299 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn.
Press 2001) ((quoting Professor Suzanne Sherry).
240. David
Kairys,
Bush
v.
Gore Blues,
Jurist Leg.
Educ. Network
<wysiwyg://23/http://urist.law.pitt.edu/forumnew23.htnml> (accessed Aug. 6, 2001).
241. Randy E. Barnett, Left Tells Right. "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose," in Bush v. Gore:
The Court Cases and the Commentary 264 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds.,
Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
242. Michael Greve, The Equal Protection Card. The Worst Grounds May Be the Best; in
Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 260 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol
eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001); Kairys, supran. 262.
243. See Scott Turow, A Brand New Game: No Turning Back From the Dart the Court Has
Thrown, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 301 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001). Turow believes that the United States
Supreme Court's role in Bush v. Gore was a game of "tit-for-tat" with the Florida Supreme
Court, and that the United States Supreme Court Justices were voting purely along
partisan lines themselves. Id. at 303-04.
244. Randall Kennedy, Contempt of Court,Am. Prospect 15-16 (Jan. 1-15, 2001).
245. See text and discussion at suprann. 171-84.
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deciding the issue on this basis.24 6
It is, of course, speculation, but Justice O'Connor has long been a
defender of deference to the state courts, especially when state law is
involved.24 7 Similarly Justice Kennedy, especially in recent cases, has
been a strong and articulate proponent of states as "sovereign powers"
independent of action by the federal judiciary and of letting state courts
resolve conflicts between federal law and state powers.24 8
It might be unseemly to intervene and resolve a conflict between the
state supreme court and the state executive or legislature as to how an
election should be managed or, to use the language of Article II, how the
"manner" of selecting electors should be determined. To let the federal
courts, even the United States Supreme Court, resolve a dispute between
the branches of a state government as to the meaning and application of
state laws and the state constitution must have, in the final moments of
decision-making, been too much.
Resting the decision on equal protection grounds reduces the
federalism concerns. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, had
recently reaffirmed that federal judicial intervention and interpretation is
perfectly appropriate when applying the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. 249 By definition, any limitation on federal judicial
power because of the historic state role in determining the manner of
electors in Article II, must be constrained by the later requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment, applying equal protection principles to the
right to vote.25 0
Second, using equal protection grounds might capture some of the
dissenting Justices, and that, of course, is exactly what happened.
Justices Souter and Breyer accepted the equal protection analysis even
if they did not accept the remedy of remand without the possibility of a
recount. 2*51 Some "spin" might be able to express the decision as seven
to two and not five to four and, again, that is how the decision was first
perceived.2 52
Third, and here is where policy and politics intersect, there are
some real and substantial reasons to apply the equal protection clause
to the election process. Disregard for the moment, what happened to the
2000 election because of the stays, delays, and time deadlines. Stating
that there must be some standards for counting votes will ring true to

246. Greve, supran. 292.
247. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Rehnquist Court 14 (Oxford U. Press 1996).
248. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
249. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
250. Harperv. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
251. See text and discussion at supra nn. 162-65.
252. Wash. Post, supra n. 2, at 227; Unsafe Harbor,in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and
the Commentary 317 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & Wiliam Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
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almost anyone who has had experience with the actual running of
elections and the counting of votes.2 53
Candidate supporters, poll watchers, judges of elections, and the
press can all describe the near chaos that can occur, especially in close
elections, when there is a challenge to a voter, because of registration, or
to a vote because of some impropriety. Each precinct or ward in a
metropolitan area and each voting site in suburban or rural sites set
their own rules -with very little guidance and almost no oversight. 2M4
Ghost voters, multiple voters, forgotten voters, broken machines,
and lost ballots pre-existed by many years "butterflies" and "dimpled
chads." Specially assigned judges, and then later appellate judges, ruled
on an ad hoc basis as to whether a particular person should be able to
vote because he or she lost their registration card and was not on the
rolls. Other judges would have to decide whether an election return was
valid because some individuals voted who seemed to be dead or an
election box or machine appeared to be tampered with.255
Indicating that there should be some standards to be followed by
those given the responsibility to determine the "intent of the voter" does
not sound unreasonable. In fact, the controversy over the application of
an "arbitrary and capricious" test to say that there should be rules for
"uniform treatment" seems to me to make eminent common sense. 2 56 If
the equal protection basis for the decision had merely led to a remand to
the Florida Supreme Court, and that court had had the time to develop
standards for a recount, there would have been little criticism of the
Supreme Court.25 7 Perhaps the Court would have been praised by "good
government" types, and liberals for taking the next step in
25 8
"democratizing" our election process.
The Supreme Court in Baker v. Car 5 9 took the first step and told

253. John Mintz & Peter Slevin, The FloridaFiasco, Wash. Post Natl. Wkly. Ed. 6, 6-8
(June 11-17, 2001).
254. Early in my professional career, I served as a prosecutor in the Philadelphia District
Attorney's office. One of my duties was to oversee election day activities. This involved
receiving complaints from other Assistant District Attorneys, lawyers, those representing
candidates (poll watchers), and judges of elections. My observations and comments are
based on these experiences. See Arlen Specter, District Attorney, The 1970-71 Report to
the People of Philadelphia283-84.
255. There was some allegation of serious fraud or impropriety during every election,
whether primary or general, that occurred while I worked as election day prosecutor.
Some resulted in subsequent prosecutions. See Arlen Specter, Passionfor Trutlv From
Finding JFK's Single Bullet to Questioning Anita Hill to Impeaching Clinton 225-26
(HarperCollins 2000).
256. But see Dershowitz, supra n. 2, at 84: "I challenge any law professor or Supreme
Court litigator to defend the majority's equal protection conclusion and remedy in a public
debate."
257. Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheersfor Bush v. Gore, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
657, 673 (2001).
258. David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. Chi. Rev. 737, 740

(2001).
259. Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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us that federal Constitutional doctrines applied to elections and that it
would not avoid applying the Constitution to election challenges.
Wesbury v. Sanders2 60° Reynolds v. Sims, 26 1 and later Harper v. Virginia
State Board of Elections262 set strict scrutiny as the outside parameter for
application of the equal protection clause. Election laws cannot make
affluence a basis for a vote (Harper). Apportionment schemes would be
based on a one person, one vote standard (Wesbury2 6 and Reynolds).
Though some argued that these cases stood for a strict scrutiny of
all partisan election apportionment standards, 264 the Court took a
middle view in later cases. Strict scrutiny of all deviations would not be
required.
Some flexibility would be allowed to preserve the normal
functioning of state governments 265 and for minor population
differences. 266 Politics is an acceptable component of an election
process, 267 but it cannot be allowed to go so far as to intentionally
frustrate the will of the majority or to intentionally discriminate against
an identified minority of voters.2 m
Bush v. Gore can be seen as the logical next step. 269 The Court
accepts the general standard of "the intent of the voter" and will not
impose a strict review of how the state applies that standard. However,
it cannot allow that standard to be so loosely applied as to allow
"arbitrary and disparate treatment" to dilute the "weight of a citizen's
vote."

2 70

The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise
of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing
elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation where a state court
with the power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with
minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy,
there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements
of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.271
Critics have argued with some justification that an analysis like

260. Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
261. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
262. See Harperv. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidity of poll tax).
263. Of course, Westbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), applied Article I, § 2 of the
Constitution, to congressional elections, but it used "equal protection" concepts. Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 561.
264. See Martin H. Belsky, Reapportionment in the 1970's: A PennsylvaniaIllustration,47
Temp. L.Q. 3 (1973).
265. Mahan v. Powell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
266. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
267. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
268. Davis v. Bandemer,478 U.S. 109 (1986).
269. Judge Posner would have preferred the Court use the due process clause as a basis
to require a more rational election recount process. Posner, supran. 2, at 130-32.
270. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-5 (2000) (citing and quoting Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
271. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.
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mine above is naive.2 7 2 The argument is that Supreme Court's decision
has no precedential value and is limited its use in the future by specific
language: "[olur consideration is limited to the present circumstances,
for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities." 273 On this point, Professor Dershowitz is
quite harsh:
The purpose of [this] remarkable cautionary line-which is virtually an
admission that this decision does not fit into a line of continuing
precedents-was to cobble together a majority for Bush.... Like a great
spot-relief pitcher in baseball, this equal protection argument was trotted
out to do its singular job of striking out Vice President Gore and was
immediately sent to the showers, never to reappear in the game. 274
However, if I am right about why the Justices voted as they did on
this issue, Bush v. Gore may well have precedential implications. 5 The
four dissenting Justices might be willing to uphold lower court decisions
mandating standards for vote counting and they could be joined by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. I am not alone in this analysis."' At
least three federal judges have applied the new equal protection
standard and have rejected defense motions to dismiss voting rights
cases based on Bush v. Gore. 7 At least one commentator has argued
that Bush v. Gore might have implications in the criminal justice
278
system.
Professor Lani Guinier hopes that "the conservative majority
will now look closely at other suits based on the principal of equal
protection-challenging disparate treatment of voters in voting
27 9
procedures."
C.

Finality, Timing, and Stays

Rejection of the critics of the Supreme Court's decision applying
equal protection principles to the Florida recount still leaves the
argument that the procedure followed had no legitimate basis. First,
some critics note that the Supreme Court stayed the recount just when
it looked like Vice President Gore might be catching up and even
272. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 637, 650 (2001);
David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. Chi. Rev. 737, 751

(2001).
273. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
274. Dershowitz, supra n. 2, at 81-82.
275. Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. Chi. Rev. 757, 771 (2001).
276. See John J. Dilulio Jr., Equal ProtectionRun Amok: Conservatives Will Come to Regret
the Court's Rationale for Bush v. Gore, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the
Commentary 321 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001);
William C. Smith, Bush v. Gore: Evermore,ABAJ. 16 (May 2001).
277. B.J. Palermo, Bush v. Gore Lives On, 23 Natl. L.J. Al (Sept. 10, 2001).
278. Michael J. Saks, Equal ProtectionAfter "Bush v. Gore," 85 Judicature 1, 8 (July-Aug.
2001).
279. Lani Guinier, A New Voting Rights Movement, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and
the Commentary 306 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
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surpassing Governor Bush. The Court, it is argued, wanted to stop any
switch in the public's attitude that Gore should concede and let the
winner go on.28°
Next, critics, including the Justices dissenting from the Court's per
curiam opinion, 28 ' stated that adopting a fixed deadline of December
12th and deciding the case on that same date, indicated the extra-legal
nature of the Court's action.2832 It is one thing to be political, even
partisan. It is another to not even attempt to follow proper form and give
the appearance of justice.8
Defenders of the Court's decision argue that "finality" to the
controversy was essential.2
If we accept the legitimacy of the equal
protection analysis, allowing the recount to continue under an improper
methodology would have been wrong. The initial stay was essential to
assure the status quo.2 85 As to the date of decision and its finality, the
Court needed to end the election contest, let the new President begin his
transition, and allow society to "move on."28 6 The "Safe Harbor"
provision gave an air of legitimacy to the Court's decision to fix the date
at December 12, 2000.287
On this issue, I must partly and ultimately side with the critics.
Once the Court decided to get involved in the controversy - by reviewing
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in the CanvassingBoard case - its
involvement in post-certification dispute was logical. Granting a stay to
determine the appropriate set of rules to apply was also appropriate. 2 88
However, remanding the case back to the Florida Supreme Court with
explicit directions that it could not act further was inappropriate.
First, it was and is the State of Florida's choice, and not the United
States Supreme Court's mandate, to apply the federal statutory "Safe
Harbor" provision. 289 All 3 U.S.C. § 5 provides is a mechanism for

280. Ronald Brownstein, In Blocking Vote Count, High Court Shows Which Team It's
Rooting For, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 266 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. &
William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
281. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 146-47 (Breyer, J. dissenting).

282. See Scott Turow, A Brand New Game: No Turning Back From the Dart the CourtHas
Thrown, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 301, 304 (E.J. Dionne, Jr.
& William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001) (quoting "conservative legal scholar"
Terrance Sandalow).
283. Anthony Lewis, A Failure of Reason, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the
Commentary 299 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
284. Posner, supran. 2, at 255-56.
285. Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling, in Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the
Commentary 289, 291 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press
2001). See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1036, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J.)
286. Harvey J. Mansfield, What We'll Remember in 2050:9 Views on Bush v. Gore, in Bush
v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 340, 340-41 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William
Kristol eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
287. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
288. See Posner, supran. 2, at 166.
289. PalmBeach County CanvassingBd. v. Harris,772 S.2d 1273, 1282 (2000).
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presumptive validity of state election returns. A state could decide that
it wanted to proceed beyond that date, 290 up to and including the date
that the House of Representatives accepts the voting tally of the
electors.29 ' As to all other issues relating to election procedures, or to
the "manner" of selecting electors (to use the phrase specifically related
to the election of a President), who in the state makes that decision is,
again, a matter for state law and not a federal matter.29 2
Second, even if the "Safe Harbor" provision is applicable, surely it is
overridden by the need to apply the federal Constitution. All statutes
must be read to be consistent with the Constitution. If the Constitution
requires application of equal protection standards to a voting recount,
those standards should be applied and a statute providing a choice for
the decision-maker as to the time of the decision should not be seen as a
limitation, let alone a bar.2 93
Third, finality is important, but American history has examples of
situations in which a delay in selecting the President has occurred, and
when things go on too long, the Congress, under Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment, has made the ultimate call. 294 Our nation can cope
with assassinations and attempted assassinations of the President,
incapacity of the President, and clouds of impeachment over a President.
Surely it could cope with a few weeks delay in deciding who is to be the
President.295
IV.

CONCLUSION

What are the practical implications of the Bush v. Gore decision? As
noted earlier, I do not believe the decision will have a long-term impact
on the Supreme Court's credibility. Based on recent studies, 29 it is
highly likely that the decision did not even have an impact on the
ultimate result.2 97
I do believe, however, that there are other and

290. Posner, supra n. 2, at 133.
291. Kmiec, supra n. 206, at 431. Congress is required by federal law to meet to count
the electoral votes on January 6. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
292. McConnell, supran. 285, at 292.
293. But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (Attorney General's application of § 5
of the Voting Rights Act must be limited by superseding equal protection clause mandate
against race-based election districting).
294. See Posner, supra n. 2, at 139-40 (discussing the Hayes-Tildon election of 1877).
There have been press reports that Justice Souter believes that if he could have delayed
the decision by a few days, Justice Kennedy would have made a majority to have the Court
not decide the case and let the Congress decide. Newsweek Book Rev. 32 (Sept. 17. 2001)
(previewing David A. Kaplan, The Accidental President:How 413 Lawyers, 9 Supreme Court
Justices, and 5,963,110 Floridians (Give or Take a Few) Landed George W. Bush in the
White House (William Morrow & Co. 2001)).
295. See Dershowitz, supra n. 2, at 91 (rejecting claims of the need for finality because of
a finality and the existence of a crisis).
296. Dennis Cauchon & Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost Gore the Election. USA
Today 1, 4 (May 11-13, 2001).
297. An analogous situation might be found in the Steel Seizures case, where President
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significant implications. Procedures were manipulated and the process
was disregarded. Many lay people criticize lawyers as being interested in
Police and often
'process" instead of just getting things done.298
government officials complain about constitutional procedures as tying
their hands.299 Businesspersons fret over the forms and regulations with
which they must comply to undertake an enterprise.30 0 The public, often
through the press,
hearkens to a less complicated world and a less law3 01
oriented society.
Some of these complaints are justified. More lawyers should be
spending time on "preventive law" and less on litigation. 30 More rules
and regulations should be written in "plain English."30 3 Attorneys
should be addressing "how to" get something accomplished and
4
3
spending less time saying that something cannot be accomplished. 0
But, there must be rules and at least the veneer that we live in a society
governed by laws and not just raw partisanship. 305 In Bush v. Gore, by
of just a case, the Supreme Court may have
deciding an election instead
306
damaged that overlay.

Truman seized the steel mills to stop a strike. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952). The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari was made "only
hours before a planned announcement that the parties... had reached a settlement."
When the steel mills learned that the appeal would be heard, the planned deal was off.
Later [after the decision declaring the seizure unconstitutional], in fact, the unions went on
to strike anyway and a settlement was worked out, very close to the original one. Charles
A. Shanor, American Constitutional Law: Structure and Reconstruction; Cases, Notes, and
Problems 104-05 (West Wadsworth 200 1).
298. See e.g. Paul Bergman & Michael Asimow, Reel Justice 251 (Universal Press
Syndicate Co. 1996) (discussing the popular movie The Star Chamber (Twentieth Cent. Fox
1983) (motion picture)).
299. Martin H. Belsky, Whither Miranda,62 Tex. L. Rev. 1341, 1341-42 (1984).
300. See Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifing Back the
Burden of Proof, 12 Ecology L.Q. 1, 44-61 (1984) (discussing proposals for environmental
regulatory reform).
301. Robert C. Post, On the PopularImage of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 379 (1979).
302. Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sander & Nancy Rogers, Dispute Resolution (2d ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1992).
303. Of course this should be true of all legal writing. See e.g. C. Edward Good, Mightier
Than the Sword xix-xxiii (Blue Jeans Press 1989).
304. See e.g. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Article Two, Editor's Note in Regulation
of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 174 (Stephen Gillers & Roy Simon eds., Aspen
Publishers, Inc. 2001) (lawyer's primary role is as counselor and advisor, not as litigator).
305. Kmiec, supra n. 206, at 432; Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, in
Bush v. Gore: The Court Cases and the Commentary 311 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol
eds., Brookings Instn. Press 2001).
306. Paul Star, The Betrayal, Am. Prospect 4 (Jan. 1-15, 2001). See Michael Doff, Was
the "Bush v. Gore" Decision Political?, Colum. L. Sch. Rpt. 22, 25 (Spring 2001): "The
problem with Bush v. Gore is not that the Court made a poor choice among a range of
legitimate options. The problem is that the Court appeared to choose a result from
completely outside that range." Id.
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